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I. INTRODUCTION
The past twenty years have seen a vast amount of legislative

activity on trust law in various offshore countries. Several
countries-Belize, Dominica, Guernsey, Jersey, St. Vincent and
the Grenadines, the Turks and Caicos Islands, and Samoa
among

them,

while

not

formally

codifying

trust

law,

have

adopted complete trust statutes offering a more or less
comprehensive body of modem laws addressing all aspects of the
trust relationship.'

Since the early 1960s, numerous other countries such as the
Bahamas, Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, the Isle of Man, the
British Virgin Islands, and Gibraltar have seen the steady
adoption of England's Trustee Act 1925 with important
variations. Several have also enacted the equivalent of England's
Variation of Trusts Act 1958 and a smaller group has enacted the
Trustee Investments Act 1961 and the Perpetuities and
Accumulations Act 1964.2 In the past ten or so years, these

* Barrister, Gray's Inn, London; Editor, J. INT'L TR. & CORP. PLAN.
1.
See Trusts Act, 1992 (Belize), reprintedin 2 INTERNATIONAL TRUST LAWS
(John Glasson MA, LLM ed., 1992) D4-9; International Exempt Trust Act, 1997
(Dominica) reprinted in I WALTER H. DIAMOND et al., INTERNATIONAL TRUST LAWS
AND ANALYSIS, DOM 107 (1998); Trusts Law, 1989 (Guernsey) (amended 1990),
reprinted in 2 INTERNATIONAL TRUST LAWS, supra, at D12-3; Trusts Law, 1984
(Jersey) (amended 1989, 1991), reprinted in PAUL MATTHEWS & TERRY SOWDEN,
THE JERSEY LAW OF TRusTS 219 (3d ed. 1993); International Trusts Act, 1996 (St.
Vincent) reprintedin DIAMOND, supra, at STV 126; Trusts Ordinance, 1990 (Turks
& Caicos Is.), reprinted in PETER SPERO, ASSET PROTECTION: LEGAL PLANNING AND
STRATEGIES, app. E (1993); International Trusts Act, 1987 (Samoa) reprinted in
DIAMOND, supra,at SAM 101.
2.
For example, England's Variation of Trusts Act 1958 applies in
Gibraltar. See TOLLEY'S TAX HAVENS 217 (2d ed. 1993).
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countries have adopted a highly targeted approach through the
introduction of special legislation addressing specific issues, such
as conflict of laws, fraudulent dispositions, purpose trusts, and
3
perpetuities.
This legislation creates a number of difficult policy issues
and raises a host of technical challenges to many traditional or
accepted constructs of trust law.

II. POLICY
The objects of offshore jurisdictions in promulgating modem
trust laws are quite different than those that most onshore
countries have had in mind when enacting more traditional trust
legislation. Whereas statutory developments in the onshore
jurisdictions are almost always a response to the needs of
domestic users of trusts, offshore legislation has little or nothing
to do with domestic needs. The primary, if not sole purpose of
the legislation is to create or enhance international trust
business in the particular country.
Therefore, the political
context of the legislation is quite the reverse of that in most
onshore countries. Historically, the difficulty faced by reformers
in securing any political interest in their legislative proposals
and the necessary parliamentary time for their enactment have
been major impediments to the development of the law in most
onshore jurisdictions.
There tends not to be such difficulty in the offshore
jurisdictions. The starting point is a combination of private
sector pressure to enhance business opportunities and
governmental desire to enhance employment and increase
revenues. In such an environment, trust legislation will be high
on the political agenda. At the same time, there is in most
offshore centers relatively little domestic trust activity, so the
need to protect the interests of beneficiaries under wholly
domestic trusts will be minimal. Thus, not only will there be
pressure for the legislation, but there will also be little if
anything militating against it. Several jurisdictions have, in any
case, adopted a "ring fencing" policy restricting the application of
the new legislation. For example, see Bermuda's purpose trust

3.
See Trusts (Choice of Governing Law) Act, 1989 (Bah.), reprinted in 2
INTERNATIONAL TRUSTS LAws, supra note 1, at D3-19; The Trusts (Special
Provisions) Act, 1984 (Berm.), reprinted in LEWIS D. SOLOMON & LEWIS J. SARET,
ASSET PROTECTION STRATEGIES:

TAX AND LEGAL ASPECTS 416 (vol. 1 supp. 1999);

Special Trusts (Alternative Regime) Law, 1997 (Cayman Is.), reprinted in 2
INTERNATIONAL TRUSTS LAWs, supra note 1, at D7-49; Recognition of Trusts Act,
1988 (Isle of Man), reprinted in SPERO, supra note 1, app. A at A-i; Trustee
Ordinance, 1961 (Virgin Is.) (amended 1993), reprinted in THE TRIDENT GUIDE TO
BRITISH VIRGIN ISLAND TRUSTS 11 (1994); Trustees Ordinance (Gib.), reprinted in 2

INTERNATIONAL TRUST LAWS, supranote 1, at D11-3.
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law, 4 the Cayman Islands' STAR trusts legislation, 5 and Jersey's
statutory trust law, 6 all of which exclude trusts of land situated
in their respective countries.
In addition, several statutes
establish a creature known as the "international trust" to which
is accorded all the benefits of the modem statute but from which
7
residents or nationals of the country in question are excluded.
Even in these instances, the exclusion is more likely to reflect a
desire to preserve a limited land supply or the local tax base
rather than to protect local trusteeships.
Policy issues raised by modem offshore legislation extend
well beyond the single question of economics. There is, on the
one hand, the morality of some of the highly targeted "product"
legislation and, on the other hand, the wider question of the
There can be no
proper employment of sovereign power.

question that legislation that extends trust law to assist persons
outside the jurisdiction to sidestep what would otherwise be a
binding law raises difficult moral and comity issues.
One
wonders, for example, whether members of the respective
legislatures fully appreciate the significance of some of the asset
protection trust legislation enacted in recent years. Is it really
defensible to have a system that precludes, as does most of the
legislation in this field, a fraudulent conveyance challenge simply
because the debtor was not aware of the creditor's claim at the
date of the disposition that created the trust? Similarly, what is
the justification for imposing upon creditors the criminal
standard of proof of fraudulent intent when all other civil
matters remain governed by the civil standard?
The moral issue becomes all the more acute when the
legislation is of the ring-fenced variety. The Jersey anti-forced
heirship law is a prime example.8 Forced heirship is an integral
part of the internal law of Jersey and applies to all local
successions. It cannot be said, therefore, that Jersey's antiforced heirship law is a reflection of a local policy that abhors
forced heirship. It may be argued, however, that it is a question
of degree, but even this argument is difficult to sustain as the
new law is effective to override an equivalent law emanating from
another jurisdiction. Perhaps Jersey's approach is simply
pragmatic.
Most other forced heirship laws go well beyond
Jersey's domestic provisions and it would be difficult to impose a
comparative test as a precondition for the application of the new

law.

4.
See Trusts (Special Provisions) Act, 1989, § 16 (Berm.), reprinted in
SOLOMON & SARET, supranote 3, at 416.
5.
See Special Trusts (Alternative Regime) Law, 1997 (Cayman Is.), supra
note 3.

6.

See Trusts

Law, 1984, art.

10, § 2(a)(iii) (Jersey), reprinted in

MATTHEWS &. SOWDEN, supra note 1.

7.

See, e.g., International Exempt Trust Act, 1997 (Dominica), supranote

1.
8.
See Trusts Law, 1984, art. 8A(2)(b), (4)(b) (Jersey) (amended 1989,
1991), reprintedin MATHEWS & SOWDEN, supranote 1.
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It may be acceptable for a country to take the position that if
a foreign country considers some aspect of its laws to be of such
importance that the law should extend to the actions of its
citizens or domiciliaries outside its immediate jurisdiction, it falls
to that foreign country to prohibit such action and enforce that
prohibition.
However, it must be arguable that legislation
intended solely to defeat some foreign law with no interest in the
legislating country having no interest in the new law other than
the generation of business, crosses the line-a possible example
of this being the Cayman Islands Exempt Trust.9 This, perhaps,
is what distinguishes these laws from laws such as the United
Kingdom's Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980 and similar
laws passed in various other countries, promulgated in response
to U.S. triple damages awards under its anti-trust legislation.' 0
A common jibe at much offshore legislation comes in the
form of the "designer legislation" epithet.
This complaint
appears to combine a disapproval of legislation being used to
create a commercial product rather than directly addressing
some local difficulty, with a suspicion that the legislature is
being made available to and for the benefit of essentially private
and often foreign interests. None of this is new; it seems that the
first designer legislation--or, at least, the first complaint about
such legislation-was made in regard to Delaware's corporation
law in 1967 in the article, Law for Sale: A Study of the Delaware
CorporationLaw of 1967.11 The objections raised in this article
are remarkably similar to those made in relation to offshore
legislation: the law is drafted and the policy effectively set by a
coterie of advisers, mostly representing the private interests of
those who will profit from the legislation; 12 there is little or no.
effective legislative oversight; and the lawyers practicing in the
field, including those involved in the drafting, have a
disproportionate influence on the interpretation of the law in the
courts. 13
While there may well be real concerns regarding some of the
morality or comity issues raised by some fraudulent disposition,
forced heirship, and in earlier times, bank secrecy legislation, I
see little in the "law for sale" argument. As the Delaware article
shows, it is not a phenomenon limited to offshore centers.
Witness the legislative competition among London, New York,

9.
Which, it is understood, was originally aimed at the United Kingdom's
anti-avoidance tax legislation and was fairly swiftly countered. See Income and

Corporation Taxes Act, 1988, ch. 1, §§ 739-46 (Eng.). It has since been
employed, to questionable effect, for similar purposes against Canadian antiavoidance rules. See Income Tax Act, R.S.C., ch. 1 (5th Supp.), §§ 94-95 (1985).
Effective or not, amendments have been proposed in the 1999 Canadian Federal
Budget to counter this as well.
10.
See Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11 (Eng.).
11.
See Comment, Law for Sale: A Study of the DelawareCorporationLaw
of 1967, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 861 (1969).
12.
See id. at 863-65.
13.
See id. at 870.
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Paris, and Amsterdam for arbitration work. 14 Perhaps of more
immediate relevance in this regard are the laws passed recently
in Alaska and Delaware' s relaxing the rules concerning settlorinterested settlements, which, of course, have been made for the
express purpose of attracting business to those states.

III.

LEGAL CONSEQUENCES

Rightly or wrongly, this gamut of legislation exists and the
question arises as to whether this is the best way to develop the
law.
Two rather different approaches to trust legislation were
mentioned earlier: the all-encompassing, code-like statutes, and
the more targeted "special provisions" laws. 16 Of course, looked
at in terms of a series of interesting experiments, all of the new

legislation can be said to be helpful-although I am not so sure
that too many of the legislatures in question would be happy to
be seen as a kind of legal laboratory. However, I would express a
number of concerns regarding to the code-like statutes.
Almost all of these are based on the Trusts (Jersey) Law of
1984.17 It was eminently sensible, if not essential, for a noncommon law country like Jersey to enact comprehensive trust
laws. It needed the law to answer as many questions as possible
in order to provide a sounder basis for trusts in the island than
had hitherto been available. For such a project, compromises
were inevitable and risks had to be taken. It would be unfair not
to say immediately that the adventure has been remarkably
successful.
However, apart from Guernsey, which adopted
Jersey's innovation in modified form in 1989, this justification
cannot be applied to the other countries that have since enacted
variations on Jersey's original theme. Each is a common law
jurisdiction and had the benefit of equity and the full history of
trust law available to it. Was it wise in these places to restate,
statutorily, the whole of trust law in this way? For several
reasons, I would suggest not.
The notion behind these laws is that with everything written
down in relatively simple, modern language everyone will know
where they stand. This is patently untrue; these statutes, like
statutes everywhere, can cause as many problems as they solve.
I saw some statistics a few years ago which indicated that a
remarkable proportion, possibly as high as ninety percent, of all

civil litigation in England is concerned in whole or in part with
statutory interpretation. This, of course, does not mean that one

14.
15.

See id. at 861-88.
See ALASKA STAT. § 34.40. 110 (Michie 1998); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§

3570-76 (Supp. 1998).
16.
See supranotes 1-2 and accompanying text.
17.
See Trusts Law, 1984 (amended 1989, 1991) (Jersey), reprinted in
MATTHEWS & SOWDEN, supra note 1.
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should not try, but it does suggest that circumspection is the
order of the day and matters not in need of-or, perhaps, not
suitable for-statutory reduction should be left alone.
What benefit has been gained in, say, the Turks and Caicos
Islands (TCI) or Belize, by defining the word "trust" or, even less,
"beneficiaries"?
Section 3 of TCI's Trusts Ordinance 1990
provides:
3. A trust exists where a person (known as a trustee) holds or has
vested in him or is deemed to hold or have vested in him property
which did not form, or which has ceased to form, part of his own
estate(a) for the benefit of any person (known as a beneficiary) whether
or not yet ascertained or in existence; or
(b) for any purpose which is not for the benefit only of the trustee;
or
(c) for such benefit as is mentioned in paragraph (a) and also for
any such purpose as is mentioned in paragraph (b). 18

The Belize definition 19 is almost identical except that it deals
with purpose trusts differently in paragraph (b):
(b) for any valid charitable or non-charitable purpose which is not
20
for the benefit only of the trustee;

There is nothing remarkable or offensive in these definitions.
However, as always, one statutory definition begets another.
Both statutes-as in almost all of the quasi-codes--contain a
veritable dictionary of sub-definitions. The TCI law states:
"beneficiary" means a person entitled to benefit under a trust or in
whose favour a discretion to distribute property held on trust may
be exercised;
"settlor" means a person who provides trust property;
"trust"includes (a) the trust property; and
(b) the rights, powers, duties, interests, relationships and
obligations under a trust;
"trust property" means the property for the time being held in
21
trust;

With this shorthand definition of a "beneficiary,"
have managed, unwittingly I would suggest, to
beneficiaries and power beneficiaries, thereby
enhancing the rights of mere objects of a power

the statutes
equate trust
dramatically
under these

laws. In the modem offshore trust, the rights of such objects are
fundamentally important, both in terms of taxation and in estate

planning

generally

where much

depends

on

the limited

18.
Trusts Ordinance, 1990, § 3 (Turks & Caicos Is.), reprinted in SPERO,
supranote 1, app. E.
19.

See Trusts Act, 1992, § 2 (Belize), reprintedin 2 INTERNATIONAL TRUST

LAWS, supranote 1, at D4-9. Unlike the Belize Act, the TMI Ordinance prohibits
trusts for purposes in relation to which there is no beneficiary (not being a
charitable purpose). See Trusts Ordinance, 1990, § 12(2)(a)(iii) (Turks & Caicos
Is.), reprintedin 2 INTERNATIONAL TRUST LAWS, supranote 1, at D 18-3.
20.
Trusts Act, 1992, § 2(b) (Belize), reprinted in 2 INTERNATIONAL TRUST

LAWS, supranote 1, at D4-9.
21.
Id. § 2(l).
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entitlements of objects of powers. These definitions may prove to
be exceptionally wide. In trusts that have powers to add persons
to discretionary classes of beneficiaries, is the possibility that a
person may be added sufficient to render him "a person . .. in

whose favour a discretion to distribute property held on trust
22

may be exercised."
This could have dramatic tax and other consequences. The
simple answer may be that until added, the discretion cannot be
exercised. If this particular precondition excludes a person from
the class until satisfied, what happens to other preconditions,
such as an age qualification or a consent requirement? It may
23
well turn on what is meant by the exercise of discretion.
The definition of "settlor" in the TCI Ordinance is also of
interest.2 4 This definition is the same as in the original Jersey
law and is also found in the Belize and other quasi-codes. 2 s The
word "provides" in the Jersey definition would seem to follow
from a U.K. tax case in which it was held that the word implies
an element of "bounty."2 6 The case involved anti-avoidance
provisions of impossibly wide import, that the court cut down to
something sensible by importing the bounty requirement in all
dispositions otherwise affected by the provisions. 2 7 This is
hardly the normal meaning of "provide," and one wonders
whether foreign courts will feel obliged to interpret the
If not, "settlor" may not be
expression in the same way.
restricted to the person who made the beneficial disposition of
the property to create the trust and might, perhaps, be extended
to a trustee who appoints or advances property to another
The St. Vincent International Trusts Act 1996
settlement.
adopts a different approach and describes a "settlor" as "a
person who makes a disposition of property on or to a trust" and
contains a wide definition of "disposition."28 Nowhere is there
any reference to the making of a beneficial disposition. Is this
implied by virtue of the disposition being "on or to a trust"?
Under general property law, only the beneficial owner of assets
can make a beneficial disposition of them upon trust.
The process does not stop there. In many of the quasicodes, it was necessary to specify the nature of a beneficiary's
interest and to define that interest. Taking the TCI Ordinance
again, Section 2(1) states that:

22.
Id.
23.
Consider Section 15(4) of the Perpetuities and Accumulations Act
1964 (England).
See id. § 2 ("'settlor' means a person who provides trust property").
24.
25.
Compare id. with Trusts Law, 1984 (Jersey), art. 1, reprinted in 2
INTERNATIONAL TRUST LAWS, supra note 1, at D15-3.
See Inland Revenue Comm'r v. Plummer, [1979] 3 All E.R. 775, 78326.
84 (H.L.).
27.
See id.
International Trusts Act, 1996, § 3 (St. Vincent), reprinted in 2
28.
DIAMOND, supra note 1, at STV 126.
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"interest of a beneficiary' means his interest under a trust and
29
references to his interest have a corresponding meaning;

and Section 11 provides that:
The interest of a beneficiary is movable property and, subject to
the terms of the trust, may be sold, pledged, charged, or otherwise
30
dealt with in any manner applicable to such property.

In England-and

generally

within the

Commonwealth-the

interest of a mere object of a power is not property capable of
immediate assignment, 3 1 so that a voluntary assignment of any
benefit that might accrue will not be enforced although a
Has the TCI
contract of assignment for value will be. 3 2
Ordinance (and similar quasi-codes) had the effect of promoting
the mere spes of an object of a power to the status of property?
Is the effect of Section 11 to give the object of a power an
interest, presumably in the trust fund, that is capable of
assignment? Perhaps Section 11 is to be read as, "[t]he interest,
if any, of a beneficiary," but the tenor of the section does suggest
an assumption that all beneficiaries have some interest.
The purpose of my comments is not to pick at these efforts,
but to demonstrate that the all-encompassing approach is illadvised.
There is little doubt that the trust has become
something of a barnacle-encrusted ship. Trust law has worked
its way into a corner in several respects, and the new laws have
succeeded in correcting much of this. But it is all too easy to
throw the baby out with the bath water. A good example of this
is found in the breach of trust provisions of several of the quasicodes. Take Section 50 of the Belize Trusts Act 1992:
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act and to the terms of the
trust, a trustee who commits or concurs in a breach of trust is
liable for -

(a) any loss or depreciation in value of the trust property
resulting from the breach; and
(b) any profit which would have accrued to the trust property
had been no breach.
(2) A trustee may not set off a profit accruing from one breach of
trust against a loss or depreciation in value resulting from
33
another.

Although this succinct provision may be attractive, it raises a
number of issues. First, it does not restate the key element of a
trustee's liability-the duty to account as distinct from liability to
pay damages for loss. Thus, under the Belize law, assets
misappropriated by the trustee are treated as though they
remain part of the trust fund, and the trustee is not liable for the
accounting of the assets. Instead, the trustee is made liable for

29.
The Trusts Ordinance, 1990, § 2(1) (Turks & Cacos Is.), reprinted in
SPERO, supranote 1.
30.
Id. at § 11.
31.
See In re Brooks' Settlement Trusts, [1939] 2 All E.R. 920, 924 (Ch.).
32.
See In re Coleman, 39 Ch. D. 443 (1888).
33.
Trusts Act, 1992, § 50(1), (2) (Belize), reprinted in 2 INTERNATIONAL
TRUST LAWS, supra note 1, at D4-9.
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the loss "resulting" from his breach so that every breach,
whether positive or negative, is treated in the same way.
Take the classic example of the trustee who has no powers
to delegate investment management but who puts funds in the
hands of an investment manager and permits it to buy and sell
investments at its discretion. The manager is highly regarded; it
exercises all proper care and adopts proper investment policies.
The market subsequently collapses, October 1987-style, and
significant losses ensue on the portfolio. If the trustee, instead
of delegating to the investment manager, had obtained and acted
on its advice, the trustee would have made exactly the same
investments as the investment manager and with the same loss

ensuing.

However, under the traditional duty to account, an

improperly delegating trustee must account for the full amount
of the funds paid to the investment manager. The position
under the Belize--or any of the other quasi-codes adopting a
similar rule3 4-will be different. A causative liability test appears
to have been introduced under which it is likely that the loss on
the investments will be found to have arisen by virtue of the
market collapse, rather than the invalid delegation. This may be
a good thing, but it represents a significant reduction in trustee
responsibility.
Operating to the opposite effect is Section 50(2) Qf the Belize
Act, 3 S which seeks to prohibit setting off a loss on one breach of
trust against a gain on another. This accurately reflects the
general rule but misses the very helpful qualification to it found
6
in Bartlett v. Barclays Bank Trust Company Ltd. (No. 2),3
whereby losses and gains stemming from the same transaction
or policy can be offset. Interestingly, the TCI ordinance managed
to catch this, but none of the quasi-codes appears to have done
SO.

IV. SOME WIDER ISSUES

Although the Bartlett case preceded the enactment of the
original Jersey law, this example highlights a further difficulty
with the quasi-code approach-subsequent judicial developments in the common law world will be lost to these
jurisdictions, pending an amendment to the statute. It can be
countered that this is the problem with statutory law generally,
but the problem with the quasi-codes is that they are reducing to

34.
It is submitted that the mischief-if it is such-lies in the introduction
of the causative element. Thus, even under the similar provisions in the TCI and
Jersey statutes, the same will apply notwithstanding the express preservation in
these laws of the old law. See The Trusts Ordinance, 1990, § 24 (Turks & Caicos
Is.), reprinted in SPERO, supra note 1; Trusts Laws, 1984, art. 21 (Jersey
(amended 1989, 1991), reprintedin MATTHEWS & SOWDEN, supra note 1.
35.
See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
36.
See Bartlett v. Barclays Bank Trust Co. (No. 2), 2 [19801 All E.R. 92,
96 (Ch.).
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statutory formulae rules and concepts that are unsuited to this
treatment or that have yet to be fully worked out-hence their
present uncertainty-and are all the more likely to receive
judicial attention in future years.
The trust is a common law invention, the product of
experience over many years. But the more it is reduced to
legislation, the more formalistic it becomes, and the less able it
will be to respond to new situations and challenges. The quasicode approach-and, to a much lesser extent, the targeted
approach-also results in a fragmenting of the trust law. The
trust has benefited immensely from the relative uniformity of
most general principles throughout the Commonwealth and
other common law countries. This has enabled developments, in
the form of judicial pronouncements, in one country to be freely
adopted in others. With the imposition of the quasi-codes, the
concern is that in the future there will exist a multiplicity of

trust systems, many of which will be unable to contribute to, or
benefit from, the general development of trust law.
This threat of formalistic reduction leads to another
concern: the personification of the trust. While, colloquially, it is
acceptable to speak in terms of "the" trust and of what is "in" it,
and of transferring property "to it," it is essential to keep firmly
in mind that a trust is not an entity but a relationship. We can
all accept, as a matter of conveyancing simplicity, that a transfer
"to the XYZ Trust" means a transfer to the trustees of that trust
as the trustees thereof, but the gradual process of conceiving the
trust as a thing does not, unfortunately, stop there. We now see
legislation that speaks glibly of property being provided "to a
trust," of property held "in a trust," and, even worse, of suing
"the trust," of actions being brought against "the trust," and of
the service of documents upon "a trust."3 7 What these last
examples are supposed to mean, I have no idea-although we
saw in the Cook Islands, Orange Grove case that proceedings
were in fact brought both in California and in the Cook Islands
against "the trust."
The problem is twofold. First, lazy terminology leads to lazy
thinking-a common example being in purpose trust legislation,
where one often finds references to duties being owed to a
"purpose." This is meaningless. There can be a duty to achieve
or promote a purpose, but that duty must be owed, if at all, to a
person capable of enforcing it. Several of the quasi-codes
provide for "registered trusts." Of itself, this is not offensive and

neither is it new, 38 but the concept has moved on to the extent
that we now have a registered office of a trust-for example, in

37.
International Trusts Act, 1984, § 19 (Cook Is.), reprinted in SPERO,
supra note 1 (not a quasi code statute); The International Exempt Trust Act,
1997, § 41 (Dominica) reprintedin 1 DIAMOND, supra note 1.
38.
Registration was, and remains, a requirement of the 1926
Liechtenstein trust law. See Personen und Gesellschaftsrecht (PGR), 20 Jan.
1926 (National Law Gazette, 1926/4).
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the Cook Islands' International Trust Act and Dominica's
International Exempt Trust Act.3 9
Secondly, this leads to, and is in part caused by, the
reduction of the trust to a product. My objections here are not
those
of a
sniffy
purist
remonstrating
against the
commercialization of a treasured concept. Far from it; my
concern is that if we are not careful we wll destroy the concept,
and with it the substantial commercial and social opportunities
it offers.
The problem with "product" thinking is very much linked to

a further and final concern. This is the fear that there is a lack
of appreciation for the awesome power of legislation. In theory,
everything can be put right with legislation, but one must, first,
be crystal clear as to whether anything is wrong and, second, be
equally sure that the remedy is right and proper. A cavalier
approach to legislative power, coupled with a "product
mentality, can be a dangerous mix. I end with a prime example
of what can result from this-the St. Vincent statute. The desire
for ever more attractive asset protection trust legislation appears
to have given rise to the notion that solutions lie in ever shorter
limitation periods. Unfortunately, in its enthusiasm for this
approach, the legislature has decided to limit claims for breach
of trust to two years from the date of commission. 40
Read
literally, this will make it virtually impossible for any beneficiary
to sue for breach of trust, as most breaches will be discovered
well after this period. In an attempt to do justice in such cases, I
suspect that the courts will find a great number of continuing
breaches, continuing, that is, up to the date of discovery.

39.
See International Trusts Act, 1984, § 18 (Cook Is.), reprintedin SPERO,
supra note 1; International Exempt Trust Act, 1997, § 41 (Dominica) reprintedin
1 DIAMOND, supranote 1, at DOM 119.
40.
See International Trusts Act, 1996, § 42 (St. Vincent) reprinted in 2
DIAMOND, supra note 1, at STV 140.
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